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I Introduction
Since its independence, the Philippines
had been called the showcase of democracy
in Asia, having acquired American political
institutions. Similar to the United States,
it had a two-party system. The two
major parties, namely, the N acionalista
Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP),1)
had alternately captured state power
through elections, while other political
parties had hardly played significant roles
in shaping the political course of the
country. 2)
* *MI§;q:, Asian Center, University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila,
the Philippines
1) The leadership of the two parties was composed
mainly of wealthy politicians from traditional
elite families that had been entrenched in
provinces. The parties in each province were
structured based on vast networks of patron-
client type relationships between individuals
cutting across social classes. This kind of
parties are hereinafter referred to as traditional
parties.
2) One major challenge to the political system as
such was the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan
(HMB) or the National Liberation Army, a
peasant army in Central and Southern Luzon,
which staged armed rebellion under the leader-
ship of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
(PKP) against the government in 1949. But
The imposition of martial lawS) by
President Marcos In September 1972
shattered Philippine democracy. The
country was placed under Marcos' au-
thoritarian control until the revolution of
February 1986 which restored democracy.
At the same time, the two-party system
collapsed. The traditional political forces
lay dormant in the early years of martial
rule when no elections were held. When
elections were resumed in 1978, a single
dominant party called Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) emerged as an admin-
istration party under Marcos, while the
traditional opposition was fragmented which
saw the proliferation of regional parties.
Meantime, different non-traditional forces
such as those that operated underground
and those that joined the protest movement,
which later snowballed after the Aquino
assassination in August 1983, emerged as
significant political actors especially In
opposition to Marcos.
The period from September 1972 to
February 1986 when the special presidential
it was effectively suppressed by the government
by the mid 1950s.
3) For discussions on the circumstances under
which martial law was declared and the reasons
why it was declared, see, for example, Brillantes,
Jr. [1987] and Daroy [1988].
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election was held that triggered off the
revolution is politically a very interesting
period. This is so not only because various
political forces, including those that had
hardly been significant actors before martial
law, came into play but also because they
interacted with one another in a complicated
way. They did so sometimes as allies and
at other times as adversaries both above- and
underground leading to the overthrow of
Marcos' authoritarian regime.
Many scholars have studied the develop-
ment of these various political forces and
their interaction. Many studies were
published in a competing manner shortly
before and after the revolution. They have
presented various viewpoints, interesting
interpretations and insightful analyses. 4)
However, although their studies are based
on fairly abundant data, there still is room
for further fact-searching to make significant
scholarly contributions. This is because
the details have not always been documented
sufficiently and have sometimes been mis-
represented especially regarding the under-
ground social democrats. 5) In addition,
since their studies have concentrated mostly
4) The most comprehensive works on this topic
will be Wurfel [1988] and De Dios et al. [1988].
Those from the leftist viewpoint include Malay,
Jr. [1988] and Avinales [1988]. Others include
Nemenzo [1985], Lande [1986] and Thompson
[1988].
5) The reasons why the development of the under-
ground social democrats under the Marcos
regime has not been documented sufficiently
will be that it had been very difficult to have
access to data and that their force was relatively
small so that they did not draw so much atten-
tion as the CPP-NDF-NPA. But their role in
the anti-Marcos struggle should deserve more
attention.
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on the national level, even factual infor-
mation about what happened at the local
level has not yet been systematically
provided.
In view of this, what follows is an attempt
to give an account of how different political
forces, especially political parties, developed
and interacted with one another in the
period in question. It first inquires into
the development at the national level and
then focuses in relation to it on the province
of Batangas as a case at the local level. 6)
II The National Scene
Upon the imposition of martial law,
Marcos arrested many of his political
enemies of different persuasions and
suppressed political activities against his
government. He abolished the Congress
and suspended elections for several years.
While the people were silenced with fear
or acquiesced with a hope for social reform
and economic development, he established
his martial law regime. Under his strong
influence, a new constitution was promul-
gated in 1973. Its transitory provisions
and subsequent amendments virtually gave
him dictatorial powers for an indefinite
"interim" period. Marcos consolidated his
control over the military. He attacked the
economic bases of powerful political families
that he called oligarchs to be taken over
by his close associates or cronies. He
elevated technocrats to key government
positions including cabinet ministers which
6) This paper is a slightly revised version of a part
of the author's Ph.D. dissertation [Kimura
1990: 87-121].
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had previously been given to politicians.
Faced with the situation, traditional
political forces such as the NP and the LP
whose primary activity was to gain power
and patronage through electoral contests
became inactive. They were reactivated
only in 1978 when elections were resumed.
In contrast, non-traditional political forces
came to play significant roles as opposition
to Marcos. The most important of all was
the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP). Others included the social demo-
crats, civil libertarians and human rights
advocates, and certain segments of the
religious sector. (The Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) is excluded from
the discussion here on the ground that it is
limited to Muslim Mindanao.)
The CPP was founded on December 26,
19687) by Jose Ma. Sison who was then
leading the Kabataang Makabayan (KM)
or the Patriotic Youth League. Affiliated
with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
(PKP) for some time, he split with it in 1967
because of irreconcilable differences with
its old leadership. Influenced by Mao
Zedong thought, the CPP committed itself
to the revolution by means of a protracted,
rural based "people's war." In January
1969, Bernabe Buscayno and his men, who
had been with remnants of the Hukbong
Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the
National Liberation Army m the
7) However, Gregg Jones suggests that the
founding congress was delayed and started on
January 3, 1969 and that the founding members
agreed that the official date would be recorded
as December 26, 1968 (the seventy-fifth anni-
versary of Mao Zedong's birthday) [Jones
1989: 17].
Pampanga-Tarlac area, joined the CPP and
in March of that year formed its military
arm, the New People's Army (NPA).8)
The NPA started as a small army in Tarlac
with twenty automatic rifles and fifteen
handguns. By the time martial law was
declared, its armory had increased to
350 high-powered weapons. Its opera-
tional zone had already extended to the
Cagayan Valley in Northern Luzon, and it
had a few armed propaganda units in Bicol,
Southern Luzon, Western Visayas and
Mindanao [Umali Undated as quoted in
Nemenzo 1985: 57].
Under martial law, the NPA grew
rapidly despite military repression. Op-
pression radicalized many activists, most
of whom were students, and drove them
underground to join the CPP-NPA. They
in turn contributed greatly to its rural
orgamzmg. As of 1983, the NPA had at
least 12,000 full-time guerrillas and 35,000
part-time militias. It was operating in
56 out of 72 provinces, and in 400 out of
1,500 municipalities. It was argued that
at least 20 percent of the barangays were
controlled or infiltrated by the NPA
[Nemenzo 1985: 57]. In addition, the
Cpp initiated the formation of the National
Democratic Front (NDF) in 1973 in order
to bring together all forces hostile to what it
called the "US-Marcos dictatorship."
With the NPA as one of its component
organizations, the NDF has since become
a countrywide apparatus having branches
in all provinces and cities [Nemenzo
8) For an excellent account of the establishment of
the CPP, see Nemenzo [1984] and Jones [1989].
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Undated: 21].
While many radicalized activists joined
the CPP-NPA-NDF, others with a social
democratic orientation kept a distance from
them and continued their own anti-Marcos
struggle. There emerged two significant
organizations of social democrats, namely,
the Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng
Pilipinas (PDSP) or the Philippine Demo-
cratic Socialist Party and the Katipunan
ng mga Sandigan ng Pilipino (KASAPI).
The PDSP has its origin in different
groups organized by the activists at the
turn of the decade. In 1971, the Katipunan
ng mga Demokratikong Sosyalistang
Pilipino (KDSP) or the Philippine Social
Democratic Movement was formed by
seventeen such groups, among them the
Hasik-Kalayaan headed by Norberto
Gonzales and the Kilusan ng mga Anak ng
Kalayaan by Fr. Romeo J. Intengan.
In May 1973, the KDSP was reorganized
into a political party to be called the
PDSP. The party described itself as
Filipino nationalist, democratic, socialist
and committed to the armed struggle for
national liberation [PDSP 1983 as quoted
in De Dios et al. 1988: 434-435]. In
1976, the PDSP and another social demo-
cratic organization, namely, the Lakas
Diwa formed in 1970 by Ed Garcia
together with Noel Tolentino, Conrado
Limcaoco, Ed Valenzuela, Mar Canonigo
and others, merged to form the Nagkakai-
sang Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng
Pilipinas (NPDSP) or the United Philippine
Democratic Socialist Party. Norberto
Gonzales, Fr. Romeo Intengan (the ideo-
logue of the PDSP) and Mar Canonigo
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became its chairman, vice-chairman and
secretary-general respectively. (NPDSP
was renamed PDSP in 1980.)
In the early years of martial law, their
force was so small that they did not draw
the attention of the government. In
December 1977, the NPDSP along with
some anti-Marcos politicians, most of whom
were LP leaders, created an alliance called
Katipunan ng Bayan para sa Kalayaan
(KABAKA) to boycott the referendum in
that month. The NPDSP provided the
mass base for the politicians whose political
machinery had broken down with the advent
of the martial law regime. In the Interim
Batasang Pambansa elections of April
1978, it actively supported and campaigned
for the LABAN candidates in Metro
Manila. It also initiated the April 6 noise
barrage and provided poll watchers. Im-
mediately after the elections, the NPDSP
was declared a subversive organization by
the government, and its principal leaders
were arrested. From then on, realizing
that parliamentary struggle was meaning-
less under the dictatorship, it boycotted all
the elections before 1986 and concentrated
in armed struggle. In 1980, the PDSP
set up a headquarters in Sabah in alliance
with the MNLF. By this time, it had
established its military arm, the Sandigan. 9 )
KASAPI was founded in 1970 by young
activists, among them Jose Luis Alcuaz
and Herman Laurel who became Chairman
9) The account of the PDSP here is based on the
author's interviews with Mar Canonigo, Quezon
City, July 29,1988; Roy Oliveros, Quezon City,
September 8, 1989; and Norberto Gonzales,
Quezon City, September 13,1989.
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and Secretary General, with Fr. Jose
Blanco as spiritual leader. It was based
in the Jesuit-run Apostolic Center. When
martial law was declared, some leaders were
captured; members became inactive; and
the organization experienced a set back.
In mid-1973, KASAPI started to rebuild
by organizing students, the urban poor
and a segment of professionals. Along
with the PDSP and Lakas Diwa, it partici-
pated in the negotiations, which practically
started in 1973, to unite the social demo-
crats. But, when the NPDSP was formed,
KASAPI did not join it. Like the PDSP,
KASAPI operated underground and opted
for armed struggle against Marcos. (For
this Fr. Blanco, an advocate of active
nonviolence, became inactive beginning in
1975.) The armed elements of KASAPI,
in collaboration with certain elements of
the US-based anti-Marcos opposition,
formed the April 6 Liberation Movement,
an urban guerrilla force responsible for the
series of explosions in Metro Manila in
1980.
KASAPI also participated III the
electoral struggle. In the 1978 elections,
it formed the Partido Sambayanang Pilipino
and fielded several candidates in Metro
Manila. At the same time, it supported
selected candidates of LABAN. When
the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino (PDP)
was formed in 1982, KASAPI cadres
entered the party clandestinely, recruited
new cadres through PDP (later through
PDP-LABAN) and operated within the
party. KASAPI claims that it had strong
influence in forming the platform of the
party and in the party institute which was
in charge of membership education and
training. 10)
In August 1977, Marcos announced his
intention to hold Interim Batasang
Pambansa elections and local elections by
the end of 1978 as a step toward what he
called normalization. The former were
held in April 1978, whereas the latter were
held only in January 1980. Behind this
move of Marcos was growing domestic
criticism against the dictatorial government
and external pressure especially from the
human rights diplomacy of the Carter
Administration. The Interim Batasang
Pambansa elections were held under
a system of region-wide voting districts
with block voting in contrast to the pre-
martial law congressional elections which
had a single-member district system. The
resumption of elections reactivated the
traditional political forces.
In preparation for the elections, Marcos
as the titular head of the N acionalista Party
called a meeting of the National Directorate
of the party on February 1, 1978 to re-
organize its ranks. As a method of
reorgamzmg the party, the following
proposal which was made by former
Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr. was adopted:
To organize a coalition movement,
united front or umbrella organization
that shall include as its members N acio-
nalistas, Liberals, veterans as well as
other political sectoral and socio-civic
aggrupations and individuals who adhere
10) The account of KASAPI here is based on the
author's interviews with Boyet Montiel and
June Lee, Quezon City, October 18, 1989.
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to the ideals and principles of the New
Society, and which shall field its own
candidates in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa elections. [KBL 1985: 23]
The coalition movement was denomi-
nated as the Bagong Lipunang Kilusanng
Nagkakaisang Nacionalista-Liberal, Atbp.,
which was later renamed Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL), and started with the follow-
ing interim officers [t·bid.: 24-25]:
The KBL attracted not only most of the
Nacionalista politicians but also many of
those who were affiliated with the Liberal
Party and others. A segment of the NP
under Jose Roy, its acting president, did
not join the KBL, but adopted the candi-
dates of KBL as its own in the elections
[COMELEC 1979b: 3].
As for the Liberal Party, three principal
leaders, namely, former Senators Gerardo
Roxas, Jovito Salonga and Benigno Aquino,
Jr. who were President, Vice-President and
Secretary General of the Party respectively,
































elections. But the adoption by Marcos of
block voting led the leaders to decide to
boycott. However, Aquino, who had been
sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal
and detained m Fort Bonifacio, was
convinced by former Senators Lorenzo
Tanada and Francisco Rodrigo that it would
be better for him to launch his candidacy
[LP Undated: 18]. The election process
would provide him with the opportunity to
air his views [PDP-LABAN Undated:
1-2]. This divided the Liberal Party.
Since Aquino was detained in Fort
Bonifacio, Rodrigo invited opposition
political leaders to form a slate to be headed
by Aquino In Metro Manila. After
a series of marathon meetings, the following
twenty-one candidates were selected:
From the Liberal Party Leadership:
1. Benigno S. Aquino




6. Primitivo de Leon
7. Cesar T. Lucero
8. Rosario Planas
9. Antonio Martinez
From the Nacionalista Party ranks:
10. Ernesto Maceda
11. Juan T. David
12. Felicisimo Cabigao
13. Jaime Ferrer
From Progressives and Independents:
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I t appeared that the LP which opted for
boycott as a party would not allow the use
of its name. Consequently, since the slate
was composed of individuals from different
groups, Aquino decided to form an umbrella
organization. The organization was named
Lakas ng Bayan or LABAN for short, and
Tanada became its chairman [ibz'd.: 2-3].
Interestingly, LABAN projected the
united front idea with the left as far as
taking in four non-traditional, left leaning
personalities, namely, Barican, Boncayao,
Herrera and Planas in the ticket. The Left
under the leadership of the CPP's Manila-
Rizal regional committee supported the
LABAN candidates clandestinely.ll)
Besides LABAN, many new political
parties were formed to participate in the
Interim Batasang Pambansa elections: the
number of registered political parties, both
old and new, at the time of the elections
counted thirty-two. Many of the new
ones were regional parties [COMELEC
1979a: 512-516].
Though most of the registered parties
participated in the elections, only five could
put up a good fight against the KBL.
They were the Lakas ng Bayan in Region
IV (Metro Manila), Bicol Saro in Region V
(Bicol), Pusyon Bisaya in Region VII
(Central Visayas), Concerned Citizen's
Aggrupation III Region IX (Western
Mindanao), and Mindanao Alliance in
Regions IX, X and XI (Western, Northern
and Southern Mindanao). Among the
11) For the coalition politics among different
opposition forces under the Marcos regime from
the leftist viewpoint, see Malay, Jr. [1988] and
Avinales [1988].
five, only Pusyon Bisaya and the Mindanao
Alliance could elect assemblymen. The
overall result of the elections was an
overwhelming victory for the KBL.12)
Whether to participate or not in the
1980 local elections was another issue that
divided the opposition. While the LP
and LABAN, let alone the CPP and the
social democrats, were steadfast in their
boycott position, many other traditional
parties opted for participation. A segment
of the NP including the Laurels that had
been under the KBL umbrella split with
Marcos and fielded candidates under the
banner of the NP.
The result of the local elections was again
an overwhelming victory for the KBL.
All but four elected governors were KBL
in the country's seventy-three provinces;
all but six elected city mayors were KBL in
the fifty-nine cities. Most other local
elective positions were also taken by the
KBL. The four non-KBL governors were
Natalia F. Dumlao (NUL) of Nueva
Viscaya, Jose C. Laurel V (NP) of
Batangas, Federico O. Mengote (Inde-
pendent) of Eastern Samar, and Homobono
Adaza (Mindanao Alliance) of Misamis
Oriental. The six non-KBL city mayors
were Francisco N epomuceno (Independent)
of Angeles City, Julian C. Medina, Jr.
(NP) of Cavite City, Cesar C. Climaco
(CCA) of Zamboanga City, Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. (NUL-Mindanao Alliance) of
12) In fact, while the Pusyon Bisaya won thirteen
seats, the Mindanao Alliance and a group of
independent candidates identified as Kunsensya
ng Bayan one each, the KBL won all the other
seats. See COMELEC [1979a: 46-48, 329-
346].
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Cagayan de Oro City, Elias B. Lopez (NP)
of Davao City, and Teodoro V. Juliano
(Independent) of Cotabato City [COME-
LEC Undated-a; Undated-b].
One reason for the sweeping success of
the KBL both in the 1978 Interim Batasang
Pambansa elections and in the 1980 local
elections was the widespread use of election
frauds. But the most important reason was
that most traditional politicians especially
at the local level sided with the Adminis-
tration because Marcos controlled all the
sources of patronage and there was no
prospect of toppling him in the near future.
Therefore, in the 1978 elections, the KBL
had a well-fueled nationwide organization,
while the opposition was fragmented and
poorly organized; in the 1980 elections,
many local candidates competed for nomi-
nation by KBL.
Shortly after the 1980 local elections,
a group of prominent NP leaders who had
split with Marcos started to reorganize the
party. On March 28, 1980, former
Senator Gil J. Puyat (the party president on
leave in favor of former Senator Jose Roy),
created the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Reorganization and Revitalization of the
Nacionalista Party, and appointed to the
committee former Vice-President Fernando
Lopez, former Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.,
former Senators Jose J. Roy, Domacao
Alonto and Dominador R. Aytona with
Salvador H. Laurel as interim Secretary
General. On the following day, Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. was elected Chairman of the
committee [Laurel, Jr. 1981: 1]. Inci-
dentally, this caused the split of the NP
into the Laurel wing and the Roy Wing.
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Jose Roy did not attend the committee and
claimed his NP presidency on the ground
that he had been elected president by the
Directorate of the party in 1971 [Anonymous
1980; 1, 6]. Puyat died in March 1981.
The Ad Hoc Committee called a meeting
of the National Executive Committee on
May 10 and recommended to convene the
National Directorate on May 11, in which
Jose B. Laurel, Jr. was elected as the new
party president [NP 1989; 6].
In June 1980, negotiations for a coalition
of all opposition parties started among
prominent politicians, leading to the for-
mation of the United Democratic Opposi-
tion (UNIDO), an umbrella organization,
under the joint chairmanship of Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. and Gerardo Roxas. Coalesced
under UNIDO were eight political parties,
namely, the NP, LP, NUL, the Interim
National Assembly Association (INAA),
a segment of Pusyon Bisaya, the Mindanao
Alliance, Bicol Saro and the CCA.
LABAN also joined UNIDO on a case-to-
case basis [Laurel, Jr. 1981: 2J.
UNIDO's executive committee (the policy-
and decision-making body which was also
under co-chairmen Laurel, Jr. and Roxas)
was composed of the following members;
former President Diosdado Macapagal,
former Vice-President Fernando Lopez,
former Senators Salvador H. Laurel, Eva
Estrada-Kalaw, Jovito R. Salonga,
Dominador R. Aytona, Ambrosio Padilla,
Francisco Rodrigo, Lorenzo M. Tanada,
Rene Espina and Mamintal Tamano,
former Representative Rogaciano M.
Mercado, former Foreign Affairs Secretary
Salvador P. Lopez, 1971 Constitutional
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convention Delegates Abraham F.
Sarmiento and Antonio C. Alano, Atty.
Luis A. Jose, Assemblymen Valentino
Legaspi and Reuben Canoy, Governor
Homobono A. Adaza, Mayor Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, and Economist Emmanuel Q.
Yap [UNIDO 1985: 1].
On August 28, 1980, about two hundred
leaders of the nine groups under UNIDO
signed a document prepared by the ex-
ecutive committee and entitled "A National
Covenant for Freedom." The covenant
listed five goals topped by "the immediate
and absolute termination of the Marcos
dictatorship," and "the unconditional
dismantling of martial rule and the holding
of free, honest and orderly elections, in
order to establish a truly democratic and
representative system of government
[Laurel, Jr. 1981: 3]."
In January 1981, Marcos lifted martial
law. Then, after holding a plebiscite in
April on a set of constitutional amendments
to change the parliamentary form of
government to a presidential system, which
was approved III spite of UNIDO's
campaign for "No" votes, he called
a presidential election to be held in June.
UNIDO boycotted the election on the
ground that they could not expect free
and honest election. Marcos won handily.
But, though there were thirteen presidential
candidates including Alejo Santos who ran
under the NP-Roy Wing, the boycott by
the major opposition group reduced the
credibility of the election.
In spite of a certain extent of success in
the boycott movement, however, the
opposition could not gain much headway.
The general public were still apathetic.
In addition, the departure of Benigno
Aquino, Jr. for the United States in May
1980 followed by Jovito Salonga in March
1981 and Gerardo Roxas in June 1981
ostensibly for medical reasons weakened
the opposition leadership. But, the
opposition's efforts to expand and consoli-
date their forces continued. The process
may be described as a kind of tug-of-war
among different political groups and
personalities in their attempts to unite the
opposition against Marcos who was still
enjoying his comfortable hold on power.
The formation of the Social Democratic
Party (SDP)13) in December 1981 and the
inauguration of the PDP in February 1982
were among the noteworthy events in the
development of the opposition after the
presidential election. The first attempt to
unite the opposition began with an "Agree-
ment for Unification" signed iIi February
1982 by Jose B. Laurel, Jr., Diosdado
Macapagal, Lorenzo M. Tanada and Luis
A. Jose, representing NP, LP, LABAN
and PDP respectiv~ly. The leaders of the
four parties thereby agreed to work for the
unification of all opposition parties and
groups towards one political party [Laurel,
Jr. et al. 1982]. This resulted in the
expansion of UNIDO.
By April 1982, three more parties
including the PDP joined UNIDO,
13) The SDP was formed by former Information
Minister Francisco Tatad who had split with
Marcos at the time of the 1980 local elections
and joined the NP, Assemblyman Reuben
Canoy who had left the Mindanao Alliance, and
Assemblyman Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who had
been with the Pusyon Bisaya.
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Bicol Saro Salvador Princesa
Interim National Assembly Organization
Abraham Sarmiento
It also involved U.S.-based opposition
leaders like Benigno Aquino, Jr., Raul
Manglapus and J ovito Salonga, who
constituted UNIDO's External Advisory
Group. The formal name of UNIDO was
changed to the United Nationalist Demo-
cratic Organization with the same Acronym
[UNIDO 1985: 2-3J.
The reorganization of UNIDO reflected
the strengthening position of Salvador H.
Laurel in the organization. But the unity
of the opposition was so fragile due to their
internal leadership struggle that UNIDO
remained as an umbrella organization in
spite of the "Agreement for Unification."
In June 1982, the PDP and LABAN
entered into a merger agreement to form
the PDP-LABAN with Tanada as chairman
and Luis Jose as co-chairman. The merger
was formalized in a party convention in
February 1983 [Anonymous 1982: 1, 14;
PDP 1983: 3]. The PDP-LABAN re-
mained outside UNIDO. The merger
united the mass-based organization of the
PDP and the traditional politicians of
LABAN. It was also geographically
complementary since LABAN was Metro
Manila-based while the PDP was better
organized in the Visayas and Mindanao.
The assassination of Benigno Aquino,
extending the number of its member parties
to twelve. At the same time, following the
demise of Gerardo Roxas, UNIDO
underWeht a major leadership reshuffle on
April 22. Instead of the co-chairmanship,
it was placed under a single presidency;
and Salvador H. Laurel (a younger brother
of Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) was elected
president. UNIDO at this point gathered
most of the major opposition parties and
prominent opposition leaders under its
umbrella. Its leadership had the following
composition:
Executive Committee
President Salvador H. Laurel
Executive Vice-President
Eva Estrada Kalaw
Secretary-General Abraham F. Sarmiento
National Treasurer Gemiliano 'Mel' Lopez
National Vice-Presidents
for Metro Manila Neptali A. Gonzales
for North and Central Luzon
Pablito V. Sanidad
for Southern Luzon and Eicol
Dominador R. Aytona
for Eastern Visayas Decoroso Rosales








Members (all the heads of the political parties
and groups)
Mindanao Alliance Homobono Adaza
Concerned Citizens' Aggrupation
Cesar C. Climaco
Timek Ti U mili Tito Dupaya
Kabataang Pilipino
Luis Mario M. General
PDP Luis A. Jose
National Organization of Women and LP
Eva Estrada Kalaw
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Jr., the arch political enemy of Marcos, on
August 21, 1983 changed the political
situation overnight. Marcos' political
credibility plunged into a critical level.
An economic crisis followed. A citizens'
protest movement arose in a great magni-
tude especially in Metro Manila. Various
forms of frequent mass action mobilized
a great number of people.
The protest movement was carried out
by numerous, different groups, large and
small. The majority of them were formed
one after another immediately after the
assassination. One of the most important
aspects of the movement was the involve-
ment of the urban middle class that had
been generally apolitical. Their groups,
which were called cause-oriented groups,
joined the movement with the groups of
students, workers, the urban poor, civil
libertarians, etc.
It should not be overlooked here that
behind the protest movement were different
opposition forces that were trying to exploit
the highly politicized masses in their favor.
For example, the PDSP tried to recruit
new members and to organize the masses
or to penetrate into their organizations to
give them a political direction. 14) So did
KASAPI.15) It is natural to assume that
the CPP-NDF did the same. Also,
prominent businessmen and professionals,
some of whom had been close to Benigno
Aquino, Jr., started to organize. The
traditional political parties also tried to
join hands with the protest. movement,
14) Norberto Gonzales Interview, September 13,
1989.
15) June Lee Interview, October 18, 1989.
though the relations between the two were
not necessarily cordial except for the
PDP-LABAN.
The first major grouping of the protest
movement was the Justice for Aquino,
Justice for All Movement (JAJA) which
was launched as early as August 25 with
Lorenzo Tanada as chairman. Barely two
months after its inception, it had grown to
about ninety chapters and organizations
[Diokno 1988: 134]. Among the member
organizations were the August Twenty-One
Movement (ATOM) led by Agapito "Butz"
Aquino, the Kilusang sa Kapangyarihan at
Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY) led by
former Senator Jose Diokno, the Alliance
of Makati Associations (AMA) , the Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT), the Move-
ment of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integ-
rity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI),
the Mamamayang Nagkaisa kay Aquino
(MANA), the Concerned Artists of the
Philippines (CAP), the Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), the League of Filipino
Students (LFS), the Nationalist Alliance
for Justice, Freedom and Democracy
(NAJFD), the Samahang para sa
Pananampalataya at Katarungan (SAPAK)
the Ecumenical Movement for Justice
and Peace (EMJP), the Task Force
Detainees of the Philippines (TFD),
SANDIWA, etc. 16 )
In January 1984, the Kongresso ng
Mamamayang Pilipino (KOMPIL) was
held upon the initiative of Agapito "Butz"
Aquino. It was an attempt to unite all
16) Interview with Reli German, November 23,
1989, Makati, Metro Manila; interview with
Chito Gascon, November 28,1989, Quezon City.
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the opposition forces. It invited a wide
spectrum of political elements from the
right to the left including politicians and
leaders of the protest movement. The
congress chose fifteen leaders who would
constitute KOMPIL's Council of Leaders,
its highest governing body. But the
question of whether to boycott or participate
in the Batasang Pambansa elections of May
divided KOMPIL. The leaders reached
an agreement on a compromise formula
called "A Call for Meaningful Elections."
I t stipulated certain conditions to be met
for the opposition to participate in the
elections. The conditions included the
repeal of Amendment No. 6 and other
oppressive decrees, general amnesty and
release of all political detainees, appoint-
ment of independent-minded individuals
to the COMELEC, etc. [ibid.: 149-152].
These conditions were not met by Marcos.
But most of the traditional political parties
including UNIDO decided to participate
in the elections. The PDP-LABAN was
divided over the issue of participation.
To avoid confrontation, the party left it
to the provincial and city assemblies to
decide for themselves [Nolasco 1984: 14].
The issue together with the leadership
struggle split the LP into the Salonga
Wing, which boycotted the elections, and
the Kalaw Wing, which participated [LP
Undated: 22]. The former left UNIDO;
the latter remained under it. On the other
hand, the major groups in the protest
movement under J AJA decided to boycott
the elections. They formed the Coalition
of Organizations for the Restoration of
Democracy (CORD). CORD took over
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J AJA with almost the same member
organizations and organized boycott activi-
ties such as Lakad para sa Bayan
(LAKBAYAN) [Anonymous 1984: 1, 2].
I t has to be noted, however, that some
personalities in the protest movement, most
notably Corazon Aquino, the widow of
Benigno Aquino, Jr., opted for partici-
pation. The newly formed National
Citizens' Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL) led by Jose Concepcion also
advocated for participation [Diokno 1988:
151].
In spite of the division between those for
participation and those for boycott, the
opposition could make much headway in
the elections. Out of the 183 elective seats
of the Batasang Pambansa contested, the
opposition could win 64 (including 4 NP-
Roy Wing candidates) or about one third,
while the KBL won 112, the remaining 7
went to independent candidates. Most of
the victorious opposition candidates be-
longed either to UNIDO or to the PDP-
LABAN [COMELEC Undated-d]. Com-
pared with the previous elections, the
result clearly indicated the declining support
for Marcos. Even some ranking KBL
members such as Vicente Paterno (a former
Minister of Public Highways and of
Industry) and Emmanuel Pelaez (former
Vice-President), had left the party because
of the Aquino assassination [Anonymous
1983: 1, 2]. Paterno joined NAMFREL.
Luis Villafuerte, a former Minister of
Trade, also left the KBL and was elected to
the Batasang Pambansa under UNIDO.
In early 1984, a small group of influential
businessmen and professionals!7) started to
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consider a method of selecting the oppo-
sition's common presidential candidate.
They came up with the so-called fast-track
system, a contingency plan in case of
sudden holding of a presidential election.
In November 1984, Lorenzo Tanada,
Corazon Aquino and Jaime Ongpin became
convenors to put the contingency plan in
place. In its original blue print, the choice
of the opposition's presidential candidate
was left to the eleven possible standard
bearers (who were chosen by the Convenor
Group) and the three convenors [Cunanan
1985a: 26-29]. The eleven possible
standard bearers were Agapito Aquino,
Jose S. Diokno, Teofisto Guingona, Eva
Estrada Kalaw, Salvador Laurel, Raul
Manglapus, Ramon Mitra, Ambrosio
Padilla, Aquilino Pimentel, Rafael Salas,
and J ovito Salonga. The effort of the
Convenor Group first resulted in the
Declaration of Unity, a document signed
by the eleven possible standard bearers and
the three convenors or by their proxies
except for Laurel and Kalaw.
Almost in parallel with the Convenor
Group, the National Unification Com-
mittee (NUC) was set up by UNIDO
17) Later in 1984, these businessmen and pro-
fessionals formed a cause-oriented group called
MANINDIGAN. The founding members of
MANINDIGAN included Jaime Ongpin,
Ramon del Rosario, Jr., Alfredo Benson, Noel
Soriano, Joaquin Bernas, Ricardo Lopa, Patricia
Licuanan, Lucina Teodro, Jesus Ayala, Narcisa
Escaler and N arzalina Lim with Rodolfo
Ascuna as legal counsel. After the EDSA
revolution, many of these people came to play
important roles in the Aquino government
occupying key positions including a number of
cabinet posts.
involving mainly the opposition Batasang
Pambansa assemblymen in order to adopt
a method of selecting common candidates
for the local elections and the presidential
election scheduled for 1986 and for 1987
respectively. The NUC was composed of
representatives of different political parties
[Foz 1984: 1, 12J. Cecilia Munoz Palma
and Francisco Rodrigo became its chairman
and vice-chairman. The method of
selecting common candidates presented by
the NUC in a national unification confer-
ence in March 1985 was more or less a con-
ventional one which was to start at the
local level [Foz 1985: 1, 19].
Negotiations between the Convenor
Group and the NUC started as early as
December 1984 in order to unite the two
groups. But the process of the negotiations
were very difficult. The NUC criticized
the fast-track system as undemocratic,
while the Convenor Group maintained the
necessity to meet the emergency situation.
The first major breakthrough came in
April 1985 when the two groups accepted
an agreement made by Corazon Aquino
and Cecilia Munoz Palma. The agreement
limited presidential aspirants in a snap
presidential election to one each from five
major political parties and national organi-
zations. These five parties and organi-
zations were the LP, NP, UNIDO,
PDP-LABAN and Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN) which was then
under preparation. But the question on
how the final candidate was to be chosen
was left to further negotiations [Anonymous
1985: 1, 8]. It should not be overlooked
here that Salvador Laurel who was at the
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helm of UNIDO which had been building
up its nationwide machinery had an
advantage in the conventional method,
while the Convenors Group that was
involved in the protest movement which was
heavily concentrated in Metro Manila
could exert more political influence in the
fast-track system.
In line with the agreement, Salvador
Laurel was proclaimed as UNIDO's
presidential candidate in its convention in
June. But, other parties had difficulty in
choosing their standard bearers.
Meanwhile, efforts of the protest
movement, which were in a slump after
the Batasang Pambansa elections, to re-
vitalize led to an attempt to form a new
alliance called Bagong Alyansang Maka-
bayan (BAYAN). The negotiations to
form BAYAN started early 1985. Its
founding congress was held in May.
By this time, three major groupings In
the protest movement became clearly
differentiated. They were the so-called
national democrats, social democrats and
liberal democrats,18) Their struggle for
the leadership of BAYAN marred the
18) The national democrats were in the furthest left
among the three. Their program resembled
that of the underground left, though they
advocate militant but nonviolent struggle.
They included the KMU, LFS and NAJFD
among the largest member organizations. It is
suspected that many organizations of the na-
tional democrats are infiltrated by the under-
ground left. The social democrats included
sectoral organizations initiated by the PDSP and
KASAPI. Cadres of the two underground
organizations also formed the Filipino Social
Democratic Movement (FSDM) with other
leaders of social democrats' organizations. The
liberal democrats consisted mostly of organi.
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attempt to unite the protest movement.
On the second day of the founding congress,
the social democrats and the liberal demo-
crats walked out because of their discord
with the national democrats over the
accreditation of voting delegates. Thus
only the national democrats that were in
the furthest left among the three remained
inBAYAN. The other two groups formed
another umbrella organization called
Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin
(BANDILA) in August [Diokno 1988:
158-162].
As the possibility of the snap presidential
election grew, the controversy between the
NUC and the Convenor Group over the
selection of the opposition's presidential
candidate was taken over by a new de-
velopment, that is, the Cory Aquino for
President Movement (CAPM). It was
launched with Joaquin "Chino" Roces as
Chairman on October 15, 1985. The
purpose of the movement was to draft
Corazon Aquino by getting one million
signatures of endorsement from the people
and raising 30 million pesos by December
31,1985. The cause oriented groups under
BANDILA and the PDP-LABAN greatly
contributed to the movement by mobilizing
their organizations to get signatures.
On November 3, 1985, Marcos, realizing
the necessity to seek a new mandate and
pressured by the U.S. government, an-
nounced his intention to call a snap election
through an interview program on American
television. This set in fast motion the
opposition's efforts to select a common
zations of businessmen and professionals among
them MANINDIGAN.
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presidential candidate. On November 21,
a new coalition called Laban ng Bayan was
organized by eight political parties and
organizations, namely, the LP-Salonga
Wing, the PDP-LABAN, Panaghiusa, the
Young Philippine Party, Bicol Saro, the
NUCD, the Convenor Group and
BANDILA. It endorsed Corazon Aquino
as its presidential candidate [Laban ng
Bayan 1985].
On November 26, the CAPM achieved
one million signatures. On the next day,
Corazon Aquino, who had appeared re-
luctant at the beginning, stated that she
would run for president if Cabinet Bill No.7
which called for the special election for
President and Vice-President was finally
signed into law. On December 2, the bill
was signed into law by Marcos after it was
approved by the Batasang Pambansa.
On the next day, she affirmed her candidacy.
By December 6, five more parties adhered
to Laban ng Bayan. They were the
Mindanao Alliance led by Homobono
Adaza, the Muslim Federal Party led by
Abul Khayr Alonto, the NUL led by
Rogaciano Mercado, the Christian Social-
Democratic Party (CSDP) led by Francisco
Tatad, and Laban ni Ninoy sa Gitnang
Luzon led by Bren Guiao [ibid. : Exhibit D].
The first three had been with UNIDO.
It seems that they had just switched from
UNIDO to Laban ng Bayan or, syn-
onymously, from Laurel to Aquino.
By this time, the negotiation between
Aquino and Laurel had become the focus
of the unification of the opposition. On
December 11~ the last day to file their
certificates of candidacy, a last minute
agreement was reached between the two.
Laurel gave way to Aquino and became
her vice-presidential candidate. She ac-
cepted his condition that both of them
should run under the banner of UNIDO
[Cunanan 1985b: 6-7]. The Laban ng
Bayan and UNIDO made a coalition,
which was formalized during the election
campaign period.
Thus, the snap election turned out to be
a contest between the KBL's Marcos and
Arturo M. Tolentino, his hand-picked
running mate, on the one hand and
the UNIDO-Laban ng Bayan coalition's
Aquino and Laurel on the other hand,
with both legal leftist forces under BAYAN
and the underground CPP-NDF boycotting
the election. Almost all the political parties
and organizations were aligned into the
three groups. The NP-Roy Wing which
had been closely aligned with the KBL
supported the Marcos-Tolentino ticket.
There were two other presidential candi-
dates including Reuben Canoy who ran
under the Social Democratic Party and four
other vice-presidential candidates including
Eva Estrada Kalaw of the LP-Kalaw Wing.
But they were relatively insignificant.
One salient aspect of the Aquino-Laurel
campaign was that a great number of
volunteers together with the numerous
cause oriented groups under BANDILA
participated in the campaign and vigil
activities. The activities of these volunteers
were coordinated through VICTORY
headed by Alfredo Benson, while the
campaign activities of the political parties
were coordinated through the Aquino-
Laurel National Secretariat placed under
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Paul Aquino and Violeta R. Laurel. 19)
On the other hand, Marcos' side launched
the Marcos-Tolentino Movement to co-
ordinate the campaign activities of indi-
viduals and groups that were not affiliated
to KBL but were supporting the Marcos-
Tolentino team. 20 )
III A Provincial Scene (A Case
in Batangas)
Politics in Batangas as well as in other
provinces had been dominated by wealthy
political families that competed with one
another for political power. Of them, the
Laurels had grown the most powerful within
a fairly short period after independence
under the leadership of Jose P. Laurel,
Sr., the war-time President and Senator,
and Jose B. Laurel, Jr., the three-time
House Speaker. Since independence, most
of the congressmen and governors had been
N acionalistas, though there had been many
non-Nacionalistas in the town-level elective
posItIons. Since the Laurels had always
been with the NP, this fact means that they
and their allies (the most notable of them
Feliciano Leviste who held the governorship
from 1947 to 1971) had dominated politics
in the province. Maria Kalaw Katigbak
from Lipa City who was elected to the
Senate under the LP in 1961 and Jose
Diokno from Taal who was also elected to
the Senate under the NP in 1963 and
19) Interview with Paul Aquino, Makati, Metro
Manila, March 13, 1986.
20) Interview with an officer of the Marcos-
Tolentino Movement, Makati, Metro Manila,
February 1, 1986.
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reelected in 1969 posed a challenge to the
provincial leadership of the Laurels. But
their position was not shaken. 21 )
The declaration of martial law made
inactive the political competition among
the traditional political forces in Batangas
for several years in which elections were
suspended. Most of the politicians in-
cluding the Laurels acquiesced under
martial rule. Senator Jose Diokno, a vocal
Marcos critic, was arrested. After his
release in 1974, he continued his anti-
Marcos struggle and initiated the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) and the
Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan
ng Bayan (KAAKBAY). But they were
based in Metro Manila. In the meantime,
the underground opposition, namely the
CPP-NDF-NPA, the PDSP and KASAPI,
penetrated into Batangas.
The beginning of the CPP-NDF-NPA's
penetration into Batangas can be traced
back to several founding members of the
KM who hailed from Batangas, specifically
N asugbu, Sto. Tomas, Batangas City and
San Juan. In 1969, the KM's provincial
organization was founded by Jose Luneta;
and Rodrigo Javier became its chairman.
In 1970, that of the Samahang Demo-
kratikong Kabataan (SDK) (a splinter
group of the KM which later reconciled
with it) was established by Guillermo
Garno, who became its chairman. In 1971,
both the KM and the SDK conducted
a series of teach-ins in the province to
expand their organizations. Upon the
declaration of martial law, they suffered
21) For a brief account of the pre-martial law
Batangas politics, see Machado [1972: 59-73].
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a severe setback because of the arrest of
their leaders. Some members became
inactive because of fear. But some went
underground to sustain the organizations.
The expansion of the underground left
started in 1974 when two groups of CPP
cadres were sent to Batangas to organize
in the eastern and western parts of the
province. In later years, NPA presence
was most strongly felt in these areas. By
and large, however, their influence In
Batangas seems to have been quite limited
perhaps due to its relatively good economic
condition. 22)
The PDSP gained a foothold in Batangas
in 1974, when its ranking officer who was
a priest approached St. Francis de Sales
Major Seminary in Lipa City and recruited
new members from the seminarians, among
them Roy Oliveros. Then they tried to
organize peasants, workers and students.
In 1977, the Kapisanan ng Magsasakang
Pilipino (KASAMA), a PDSP-backed
peasant organization, was formed III
Nasugbu and Bauan. 23 ) KASAPI, which
was heavily concentrated in Metro Manila
and its adjacent area, also reached Batangas.
In 1976, KASAPI cadres organized small
fishermen in N asugbu through the Small
Bureau for Small Fisherfolks (SBSF)
which was also based in the Apostolic
--------------
22) The account of the underground left here is
based on the author's interview with one
informant who was familiar with the leftist
movement in Batangas conducted on the
condition of anonymity and also an interview
with Guillermo A. Garno, Batangas City,
Batangas, January 23, 1990.
23) Interview with Roy Oliveros, Quezon City,
September 8, 1989.
Center. 24) All told, however, the forces
of the social democrats in Batangas seem to
have been relatively insignificant.
The organizations of the traditional
political forces were reactivated at the time
of the 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa
elections. But, unlike some other regions
where viable regional opposition parties
were formed and challenged the KBL,
Region IV-A of which Batangas is a part
did not see any strong opposition party
because most of the prominent politicians
from the region who participated in the
elections ran under the KBL. Those
Batanguenos included In the twenty-
member KBL ticket were Arturo R. Tanco,
Jr., Salvador H. Laurel, Soledad L. Dolor
and Expedito lv!. Leviste. There were
only eleven opposition candidates in the
regIOn for its twenty Batasan seats
[COMELEC 1979a: 336]. Thus, the
1978 elections in Region IV-A were one-
sided and not really competitive.
The all-out electoral competition among
the traditional political forces in Batangas
resumed at the time of the 1980 local
elections. The elections were contested
between the KBL and the NP led by the
Laurels who had just split with Marcos.
There was no other traditional political
party in the province. No regional party
was formed. The LP's organization had
been disintegrated or, rather, its local
building blocks, namely, local factions, had
left the party. Most of the politicians in
the province were realigned into the two
24) Interview with Boyet Montiel, Quezon City,
October 18, 1989; and interview with June Lee,
Quezon City, October 18, 1989.
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parties. Those aspirants who were not
included in the tickets of either party ran
as independent or unofficially carried the
banner of either party.
By this time, Governor Antonio Leviste
and most of the incumbent mayors had
joined the KBL regardless of their party
affiliations at the time of their election in
1971. The NP's gubernatorial candidate
against Leviste was Jose C. Laurel V,
a son of former Ambassador Jose H.
Laurel III. The NP's mayoral candidates
were generally recruited from political
rivals of the KBL mayors in their respective
towns regardless of their previous party
affiliations.
The results of the elections were as
follows. Laurel V won the governorship
over Leviste, while Ofelia M. Carpio
(KBL) won the vice-governorship over
Conrado V. Apacible (NP). Of the eight
elected provincial board members, five
were NP, namely, Vicente Mayo, Jose
Atienza, Bienvenido Medrano, Hernando
B. Perez, and Rafael R. Recto; three were
KBL, namely, Olegario F. Cantos, Jr.,
Dominador L. Bonuan, and Maxima R.
Recto. Of the thirty-four elected municipal
and city mayors, twenty-five were KBL,
while the remammg mne were NP.
Positions of the vice-mayors and the
municipal and city councilors were divided
between the KBL and the NP, though some
independents were also elected in a number
of towns [COMELEC Undated-a; Un-
dated-b; Undated-c]. Compared with most
other provinces where the KBL nearly
monopolized the local elective positions,
Batangas saw a significant advance of the
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opposition under the leadership of the
Laurels.
When UNIDO was formed, the NP
Batangas Chapter constituted practically
the sole force of UNIDO in Batangas due
to the virtual absence of local organizations
of other traditional opposition parties in the
province. During the 1981 presidential
election campaign, the NP Batangas
Chapter organized a series of boycott rallies
of UNIDO in the major towns. But the
KBL that commanded the majority of the
mayors and far superior resources was more
active m campaigning for Marcos.
Lacking a credible opposition candidate,
however, the election was not a heated one.
The Aquino assassination of August
1983 had significant political effects in
Batangas as well, though they were not so
dramatic as in Metro Manila. For one,
legal leftist organizations which had almost
disappeared shortly after the declaration of
martial law started to appear again. 25)
But their strength should not be over-
emphasized. It hardly modified the domi-
nation of Batangas politics by the traditional
political forces. On the other hand, the
traditional opposition steadily gained
ground against the KBL, though it did not
develop in so far as to induce any significant
realignment among the local politicians.
Thus, the 1984 Batasang Pambansa
elections in Batangas were practically
a contest between the KBL and UNIDO.
The PDP-LABAN began to organize in
1983 starting from the municipalities of
Rosario and Cuenca with Dante Q.
25) Interview with a BAYAN organizer, Makati,
Metro Manila, April 11, 1989.
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Barbosa, a close associate of Ramon V.
Mitra, as coordinator. 26 ) But it could not
expand so much as to be able to field
candidates in the elections.
There were fifteen candidates altogether.
The KBL fielded Arturo Tanco (an
assemblyman, Minister of Agriculture
and Harvard-trained technocrat), Manuel
Collantes (Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs), Expedito Leviste (an assemblyman
and son of the late governor -Feliciano
Leviste) and Roberto Diokno (an ex-
congressman). UNIDO fielded Jose B.
Laurel, Jr., Tom Apacible, Hernando
Perez and Rafael Recto. Practically all
the other seven candidates were inde-
pendent, though one of them filed his
candidacy under the NP without the party's
nomination. Those elected were three
UNIDO and one KBL candidates, namely
Laurel, Jr., Perez, and Recto on the one
hand and Collantes on the other.
The boycott campaign of the protest
movement does not seem to have had
a significant impact in Batangas, although
the CORD sponsored LAKBAYAN
passed the province and that there seem to
have been its coordinators. Active
organizing by the protest movement in
Batangas was carried out after the for-
mation of BAYAN and BANDILA in
Metro Manila.
Shortly after the founding congress of
BAYAN-Southern Luzon in Silang, Cavite
in July 1985, two officers for Southern
Luzon and two leaders in Batangas who
later became Chairman and Secretary
26) Interview with Dante Barbosa, Quezon City,
August 5, 1988 and October 31, 1989.
General of BAYAN-Batangas formed
a core group to establish BAYAN in
Batangas. The core group tried to in-
corporate into BAYAN various sectoral
and multi-sectoral groups such as trade
unions, organizations of peasants, the urban
poor, the youth and students, teachers and
professionals, and religious groups.
The founding congress of BAYAN-
Batangas was held in Taal on September
28, attended by about three hundred people
including Wigberto Tafiada and Fr. Jose
Dizon, Chairman and Vice-Chairman
of BAYAN-Southern Luzon, as guest
speakers. Its initial affiliates included the
Samahang Magbubukid ng Batangas,
Samahang Mangangawil 78, Malayang
Katipunang Manggagawa sa Batangas,
and Samahang Maralita Baybay Dagat
(peasant and labor sector); Barrio Sta.
Clara Community (Batangas City based
organizations of the urban poor) ; the
League of Filipino Students (LFS) and
Kabataan para sa Demokrasya at
N asyonalismo (KADENA) (student and
youth sector); the Concerned Teachers of
Our Lady Caysasay Academy; and member
organizations of the Citizen Solidarity
Movement of Batangas, a multi-sectoral
group. Individual members of the
Southern Tagalog Attorneys for National
Democracy CSTAND) led by Tanada and
of the Medical Action Group also joined
BAYAN-Batangas. 27 )
BANDILA, the membership of which
was heavily concentrated in Metro Manila
at the time of its founding congress in
27) Interview with a BAYAN organizer, Makati,
Metro Manila, July 6, 1988.
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August 1985, also endeavored to expand
into the provinces. Its expansion work in
Batangas as well as in other parts of Luzon
was done mainly in October and November
of that year. 28 ) The social democrats
seem to have taken the initiative. Certain
BANDILA leaders, using their personal
contacts, approached organizations of
workers and peasants, youth and pro-
fessional groups, and church people. For
example, Roy Oliveros, now a researcher of
the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) who
later became BANDILA Deputy Secretary
General, approached 8to. Tomas Academy
Union in Sto. Tomas and Fr. Richard
Panganiban of St. Francis de Sales Major
Seminary in Lipa City. Riza Yapchiongco
contacted the Kapisanan ng Magsasakang
Pilipino (KASAMA), a peasant organi-
zation based in Bauan and Balayan. 29)
Prior to this, Pascual Tonog, a farmer
residing in the municipality of Bauan and
part-time employee of a trading company
in Manila, was introduced to BANDILA
Secretary General Mar Canonigo by Raul
Daza, Tonog's provincemate in Samar,
in Salonga's residence in Pasig in Sep-
tember. Canonigo gave Tonog an au-
thority to organize BANDILA in Bauan.
Tonog approached the workers of a shipyard
of the Philippine National Oil Company,
farmers and students. 30) Interestingly, the
sectoral composition of the groups ap-
proached by BANDILA apparently
28) Interview with Solphie Confiado, Makati,
Metro Manila, January 6, 1988.
29) Interview with Roy Oliveros, Manila, June 27,
1988.
30) Interview with Pascual Tonog, Quezon City,
August 17, 1988.
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overlaps that of BAYAN.
It was not easy for BANDILA to
recruit members at that time because of
fear among the people. In Lipa City, for
example, Fr. Panganiban arranged a two-
day seminar in St. Joseph Seminary in
November and invited people from different
sectors of the city to help establish
BANDILA. About fifty people attended
the seminar and some ranking officers of
BANDILA including Canonigo and Dep-
uty Secretary General Toy Nepomuceno
came and gave lectures to the partici-
pants. 31) Of the fifty participants, only
six who were members of a Catholic
Charismatic group, became BANDILA
members. The six included Willie Cucio,
a youth leader, and Eldee Latayan,
a bookkeeper of a local bank. 32 ) After all
its efforts, BANDILA could establish
itself only in Bauan and Lipa City. 33)
After the 1984 Batasang Pambansa
elections, some realignment among the
Batangas politicians took place. For
example, Maxima Recto, a provincial
board member elected as KBL, joined
UNIDO, while Ben Medrano and Rafael
Recto became identified with the Marcos
Administration. Some mayors also switched
their parties.
Local elections had been scheduled for
May 1986. It seems that the local politi-
cians started to make some preparatory
moves for the elections by 1985. But most
31) Interview with Richard Panganiban, Lipa City,
January 7, 1988.
32) Interview with Eldee Latayan, Lipa City,
February 24, 1987.
33) Interview with Pascual Tonog, Quezon City,
August 7, 1988.
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of them kept from embarking on all-out
preparations and took a wait-and-see
attitude, because the possibility of the
snap election was looming.
Most of the opposition politicians were
supporting the presidential candidacy of
Salvador Laurel, their Kababayan (province
mate). The CAPM was also launched in
Batangas under the provincial chairmanship
of Dante Barbosa. 34) But it does not seem
to have gained momentum so much as in
Metro Manila.
When the snap election was called, the
KBL campaigned for Marcos and
Tolentino. Some KBL politicians, how-
ever, reportedly campaigned for Marcos
and Laurel. The Marcos-Tolentino Move-
ment was also established III Batangas;
and Ben Medrano became its provincial
coordinator [MTM 1986: 26-27]. UNI-
DO campaigned for Aquino and Laurel.
BANDILA also campaigned for the oppo-
sition candidates separately from UNIDO.
BAYAN-Batangas adopted the "conscience
vote" position which was the decision of
BAYAN-Southern Tagalog in spite of the
decision of its national leadership to boycott
the election. 35)
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